Judicial Selection in the State of Missouri: Continuing Controversies by Stuteville, Rebekkah





Since its admission to the union in 1821, Missouri has 
been a microcosm of the national developments and 
debates that surround the issue of judicial selection. 
Missouri was the first state to use all three of the most 
common methods of judicial selection—political 
appointments, contested elections, and merit 
selection.
1
 Because of the state’s experience, the 
history of judicial selection and the controversies 
surrounding judicial selection in Missouri provide 
insight into broader national trends. This article 
explores the history of judicial selection and the 
controversies over the various selection methods in the 
state of Missouri, with an emphasis on the debate that 
has taken place in the state over the past decade. The 
article also explains why this issue is relevant to public 
policy in Missouri. Finally, it provides a snapshot of 
current opinions on the various judicial selection 




The History of Judicial Selection in Missouri 
 
The progression of judicial selection in the state shows 
that Missouri has both followed and led national 
patterns at different points in history. During the 
state’s early history, it largely followed national trends. 
In 1940, however, Missouri became a leader in a 
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pivotal national reform movement in judicial selection, 
which still has a pervasive influence on the selection 
methods used by states today. 
 
In 1820, Missouri’s first constitution was adopted and 
it called for the governor to appoint judges with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.
2
 The state’s 
approach to selecting judges through appointment was 
congruent with the methods used by many other states 
in the post-Revolutionary period.
3
 It also followed the 
model of judicial appointment outlined in the U.S. 
Constitution which grants power to the executive to 
appoint Supreme Court justices with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.  
 
Shortly after Missouri began implementing its initial 
system of judicial selection, the practice of judicial 
appointments fell into disfavor. President Andrew 
Jackson “swept into office in 1828 on a tide of public 
support,”
4
 and Jacksonian Democracy took hold 
throughout the country. Larry C. Berkson explains that 
citizens began to resent the control that property 
owners had over the courts, and wanted to “end this 
privilege of the upper class” and “ensure the popular 
sovereignty.”
5
 As a result, many states shifted from a 
system of judicial appointments to judicial elections. 
In 1848 Missourians followed the lead of other states, 
and the constitution was amended to provide for 
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Judicial elections, both partisan and nonpartisan, 
continued to be a popular method of selecting judges 
for several years. Contested partisan elections were 





 Problems, however, soon began to 
emerge, and “the practice of electing judges, while 
representing a democratic ideal, often degraded into 
the selection of machine sponsored judicial ‘hacks.’”
8
 
Missouri was no exception—judicial elections were 
captured by political machines in the state.  
 
As Laura Denvir Stith and Jeremy Root recount, the 
Democratic political machine had a “stranglehold on 
the state’s politics” in the early 1900s.
9
  This 
“stranglehold” was largely the result of “party boss” 
Thomas Pendergast, who controlled the significant 
elections in Missouri.
10
 Judges were beholden to the 
party bosses, and judges often found themselves at risk 
of losing their jobs. The precarious nature of 
judgeships in Missouri in the early 20
th
 century is 
demonstrated by the fact that between 1918 to 1941 





Problems with partisan elections began to surface in 
Missouri in the 1920s and the 1930s
12
, but the legal 
profession’s concern about the influence of politics on 
judicial election had been longstanding. Years earlier 
in 1906, Roscoe Pound’s speech to the American Bar 
Association titled “The Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice” was 
a harbinger of the growing discontent with judicial 
elections.
13
 Pound argued that “putting courts into 
politics and compelling judges to become politicians, 
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in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the 
traditional respect for the Bench.”
14
   
 
By 1940 a majority of Missourians appeared to agree 
with Pound’s assessment regarding the danger of 
mixing partisan politics and judicial elections. 
Concerned citizens, lawyers, and civic leaders joined 
together to reform judicial selection in the Missouri.
15
 
The reformers first attempted to create a “commission 
plan” for judicial selection through the legislative 
means, but when legislative attempts failed, reformers 
successfully placed the Missouri Nonpartisan Court 
Plan on the ballot through an initiative petition.
16
 In 
November 1940, voters adopted the Missouri 
Nonpartisan Court Plan with almost 55 percent of the 
vote.
17
 Missouri was the first state to adopt this plan 





Essential Features of the Missouri  
Nonpartisan Court Plan 
 
The Nonpartisan Court Plan adopted in 1940 has been 
expanded and amended, but the key components have 
been essentially unchanged, in spite of the numerous 
attempts to repeal or modify the plan. The basic 
features of the plan today are explained in Article V of 
the Missouri Constitution, and include:   
 
 Nonpartisan Judicial Commissions:  The 
nonpartisan judicial commissions screen and 
nominate candidates for judicial vacancies.  
                                                          
14
Roscoe Pound, “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with 
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o The Appellate Judicial Commission 
oversees this process for the Supreme 
Court and Court of Appeals. The 
seven-member Appellate Judicial 
Commission includes a judge, three 
lawyers (one from each court of 
appeals district) who are elected by 
The Missouri Bar, and three citizens 
(one from each court of appeals 
district) who are appointed by the 
governor.  
o The circuit courts in Clay County, 
Green County, Jackson County, Platte 
County, and St. Louis County, and the 
city of St. Louis have their own circuit 
judicial commissions. The five member 
circuit judicial commissions are 
composed of a judge, two lawyers from 
the relevant circuit elected by The 
Missouri Bar, and two citizens from 
the circuit who are selected by the 
governor.
19
   
 Judicial Vacancies: When a judicial vacancy 
arises, the nonpartisan commission reviews 
applications and interviews applicants. The 
commission then submits three qualified 
candidates to the governor for consideration. 
The governor selects one of the candidates to 
fill the vacancy. If the governor does not 
nominate any of the nominees within 60 days 
after the list of nominees is submitted, the 
nonpartisan commission appoints one of the 
nominees to fill the vacancy.
20
   
 Retention Elections: Once a judge has been in 
office for at least one year, the judge will be 
placed on the ballot for a retention election in 
the next general election. The judge must 
receive a majority of votes to be retained.
21
 
Judges are not elected for life; the terms vary 
depending on the level of court; and all state 
judges must retire at 70 years old.
22
   
  
                                                          
19
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The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan originally 
applied to the Supreme Court, the court of appeals; the 
circuit, criminal correction and probate courts of the 
city of St. Louis; and the circuit and probate courts of 
Jackson County.
23
 It was later extended to judges in St. 
Louis, Clay,  and Platte counties, and most recently 
Greene County.
24
 The plan is now used to select circuit 
and associate circuit judges in five counties and the 
urban areas of Kansas City and St. Louis as well as all 





Although the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan does 
encompass much of the state, partisan judicial 
elections are still used to select trial judges in over 100 
counties in Missouri.
26
 As explained by Michael 
Wolff, partisan elections seem “well-suited for the 
rural areas of Missouri, which are small enough so that 
campaigns are not especially expensive and the voters 
can get to know the judges and judicial candidates 
before they cast their votes.”
27
 In effect, Missouri has a 
dual system of judicial selection with different courts 
using different methods. The method depends largely 
upon the level of court and whether the jurisdiction is 
more rural or urban. 
 
 
The Ideological Debate:  
Independence and Accountability 
 
As with Missouri’s history of judicial selection, the 
ideological debates over merit systems and elections 
reflect broader national trends. The controversies 
regarding judicial selection methods center on the 
values of judicial independence and accountability.
28
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Daugherty, 316; Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor argues that the dichotomy between accountability 
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The notions of judicial independence and democratic 
accountability are grounded in the nation’s history. 
State constitutions and governing institutions do not 
necessarily mirror their federal counterparts, but the 
arguments made during the nation’s founding help 
explain the conceptual roots of the debate. The 
founders’ perspective on judicial independence in a 
system of “separated institutions sharing power”
29
 is 
detailed in the Federalist Papers. As Alexander 
Hamilton argued in Federalist No.78, judicial 





Judicial independence, however, cannot be left 
unrestrained. As James Madison asserted in Federalist 
No. 51, “ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition.”
31
 This was to be realized by a system of 
checks and balances to ensure that no one branch of 
government accrued too much power, including the 
judiciary. During his journey through America in the 
1830s Alexis de Tocqueville observed the complexity 
of the judiciary’s role when he explained that “courts 
help to correct the excesses of democracy and . . . 
manage to slow down and control the movements of 





Inherent in the independence versus accountability 
debate is also a discussion of the proper role of judges. 
On one hand, judges may be viewed as “legal 
technician[s]” who are selected based upon their 
qualifications.
33
 If this characterization accurately 
reflects reality, then concerns about excessive judicial 
independence are minimized since judges are simply 
following precedent, and objectively applying the law. 
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On the other hand, judges may also be perceived as 
having discretion which implies that they may take 
part in making the law.
34
 If this depiction more 
accurately describes reality, then concerns about the 





The advantages and disadvantages of judicial 
appointments, merit systems and elections are 
articulated by legal scholars along competing lines of 
argument regarding independence and accountability, 
and the appropriate role of judges. Since Missouri uses 
both the merit system and partisan judicial elections, a 
few of the arguments made or explained by legal 
scholars for and against each approach are outlined in 
Tables 1 and 2 (which can be found at the end of this 
article on pages 19 and 20). 
 
 
Controversies in Missouri 
 
Attempts to modify or eliminate the Nonpartisan Court 
Plan in Missouri reflect a number of these ideological 
differences as well as point to attempts at political 
maneuvering. Challenges to the Nonpartisan Court 
Plan have been numerous, and they began shortly after 
the plan was initially approved by voters. For example, 
an early challenge occurred in 1942 when the General 
Assembly placed the “Lauf Amendment” on the ballot 
to abolish the plan and reinstate partisan election of 
judges.
36




Opponents of the Nonpartisan Court Plan, however, 
have continued to press forward, using both legislative 
means and initiative petitions to repeal or modify the 
plan. Legislatively, there have been numerous attempts 
to repeal or modify the Nonpartisan Court Plan by 
members of the Missouri General Assembly over the 
past decade. The period from 2004-2012 was 
especially active with bills introduced to repeal or 
modify the Nonpartisan Court Plan in every year but 
2006. The various legislative proposals from 2004-
2014 include efforts to:   
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 Repeal the plan and move to a system of 
gubernatorial appointments with Senate 
confirmation or with Judicial Confirmation 
Commission approval (2007, 2008, 2012)  
 Require appointments under the current plan to be 
made with the advice and consent of the Senate 
(2007) 
 Require judges to receive more than a simple 
majority to be retained in judicial elections (2005)  
 Repeal retention elections completely and give the 
General Assembly power to vote on judicial 
retention (2007)  
 Increase the number of candidates submitted to the 
governor by the Commission (2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012) 
 Allow the governor to veto the first list of 
nominees (2009, 2010)  
 Change the composition of the Judicial 
Commission to include more non-attorneys than 





Most of the legislative proposals died in committee, 
but one measure was placed on the ballot. In 2012 a 
measure was passed by the General Assembly to 
change the composition of the Appellate Judicial 
Commission to give the governor four appointees, 
instead of three; replace the chief justice with a retired 
nonvoting judge; and to change the staggered terms of 
the gubernatorial appointees to four-year terms during 
the governor’s term.
40
  The measure, Amendment 3, 
was defeated with only 24 percent of voters supporting 
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In addition to sustaining legislative challenges, the 
plan has also withstood attempts to modify or repeal it 
over the past decade. Initiative petitions to either 
modify or repeal the Nonpartisan Court Plan were 
approved for circulation in Missouri in 2008, 2010, 
and 2014, but none received enough signatures to be 




The various proposals to change or repeal the 
Nonpartisan Court Plan in Missouri mirror many of the 
claims made more broadly by critics of merit systems. 
For example, the role afforded to lawyers has been 
challenged by attempts to change the composition of 
the Judicial Selection Commissions in Missouri; 
efforts have been made to reduce the alleged “elitism” 
of the plan by proposing Senate confirmation; and 
reformers have attempted to tinker with retention 
elections by requiring more than a simple majority 
vote. Supporters of the plan, however, have thwarted 
attempts to significantly alter or repeal it. Charles B. 
Blackmar’s observation in 2007 that the Missouri plan 
is “alive, well, and resilient” in the state of Missouri 




An additional overarching criticism of the plan is that 
politics cannot be removed from the commission and 
appointments. The history of judicial selection in 
Missouri lends some credence to this complaint. At 
least one observer of the system has claimed that it is 
“political without being partisan.”
44
 There is evidence, 
however, that the nonpartisan ideal of the plan has not 
always been reflected in the reality of implementing 
the plan.  
 
The evolution of the Nonpartisan Court Plan in the 
state is well documented by Blackmar in his article 
“Missouri’s Nonpartisan Court Plan From 1942 to 
2005.”
45
 Blackmar explains that many governors 
during the first forty years of the plan’s operation, with 
some noteworthy exceptions, appointed members of 
their own party as judges, which buttresses claims that 
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Scott Lauck, “House Commission in Missouri awaits scrutiny 
over next pick,” Missouri Lawyers Weekly, July 16, 2007, 2, 
accessed June 3, 2014, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.pegleg.park.edu quoting Judge 
Glenn Norton. 
45
Blackmar, 199-219.  
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the plan was not “truly nonpartisan.”
46
 Blackmar 
suggests that some commissions may have even 
stopped submitting names of candidates who were not 
from the governor’s party since they did not have a 
chance of appointment.
47
 Additionally, Blackmar 
provides accounts of the nonpartisan judicial 
commissions deferring to partisan influence and 
manipulation in the early 1950s and the 1980s. He 
explains that in 1953 Gov. Phil Donnelly and the 
Judicial Commission reached a stalemate over panels 
submitted which the governor believed “demonstrated 





Additional charges of political mischief in the judicial 
selection process arose thirty years later in the 1980s, 
and the controversies are reported by both Blackmar 
and Jay A. Daugherty from different perspectives.
49
 
According to Daugherty, in 1982 there were three 
vacancies on the Supreme Court and “one sitting judge 
allegedly manipulated the merit plan to ‘hand-pick’ 
three new members of the court.”
50
 Only a few years 
later, in 1985, a panel was submitted to Gov. John 
Ashcroft which included “the governor’s thirty-three 
year old gubernatorial chief of staff, who had no 





Attempts to infuse partisan influence into the selection 
process were not limited to the 20
th
 century; they 
continued well into the 21
st
 century. As reported by 
Lora Cohn, “controversy exploded” in the summer of 
2007 when the nonpartisan judicial commission began 
considering the replacement of Supreme Court Judge 
Ronnie White.
52
 This was Gov. Matt Blunt’s first 
appointment to the Supreme Court and Blunt allegedly 
                                                          
46
Blackmar, 205. Blackmar explains that there are some notable 
exceptions, such as the appointment of Walter Bennick by 
Forrest Smith, Governor Phil Donnelly’s appointment of two 
Republicans, Governor John Dalton’s appointment of a 
Republican, and Governor Hearnes’s appointment of a 
Republican [Ibid, 205-207.]  
47




Blackmar, 199-219; Daugherty 315-343. 
50
Daugherty, 328; Blackmar takes exception to Daugherty’s 
claim that there was a scandal during the 1982 appointments 
[Blackmar, 209-210]. 
51
Daugherty, 328.  
52
Lora Cohn, “Strategic Maneuvering in the Fight over the 
Missouri Judicial Selection Process,” Central States 
Communication Association Conference, April 14-18, 2010, 7.  
“demanded a conservative candidate.”
53
  The 
commission sent the top three candidates to Blunt for 
White’s replacement, but upon receiving the slate, the 
governor requested information on all thirty 
candidates; the commission refused to turn over this 
information.
54
 Blunt and the commission, headed by 
Chief Justice Laura Denvir Stith, were at an impasse.
55
 
Cohn explains that “Blunt went into attack mode, 
threatening to sue for the materials and proposing that 
all three candidates had to answer a 110 question 
survey that covered even behavior in elementary 
school. He eventually selected the single Republican 




Cases of political positioning have helped fuel 
arguments that the Missouri Plan “has not delivered on 
its promises,” which include being less political than 
other forms of selection.
57
 Proponents of the plan 
concede that merit selection has flaws, but it is still 
preferable to the alternative of elections.
58
    
 
 
The Implications of Judicial Selection  
for Policymaking in the State of Missouri 
 
The method of judicial selection used by a state has 
clear implications for the distribution of power within 
a state among political institutions and interest groups. 
The method chosen can influence the power held by 
the governor, legislature, or organizations such as bar 
associations. One central question, however, is why 
should judicial selection be of concern to the citizens 
of the state of Missouri?  
 
The issue of judicial selection is important beyond the 
legal community because state judges have the 
opportunity to influence policy and the lives of 
citizens. The degree to which judges influence policy 
and exercise discretion is debatable, but opportunities 
                                                          
53
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O’Connor and Jones, 24; Blackmar states that “the burden is 
on those who challenge the Plan to come up with a method 
which is both better and practicable” [Blackmar, 217]. 
Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014) | Missouri Policy Journal | 13 
 
for influence exist. As Daugherty notes, “precedent is 
usually followed, and decisions are commonly reached 
objectively and dispassionately.  
 
However, at times, judges must act subjectively and 
more like legislators.”
59
 Paul Brace, Melinda Gann 
Hall and Laura Langer contend that state supreme 
courts have “extraordinary discretion in rendering 
decisions” and they can have a significant impact on 
the lives of citizens.
60
 They argue that “as the courts of 
last resort, state supreme courts have the final authority 
on many issues that are critical to citizens’ daily lives 




Moreover, the method used to select judges may affect 
judicial decision-making. Richard Caldarone, Brandice 
Canes-Wrone, and Tom S. Clark explain that “a wealth 
of scholarship suggests that institutions pertaining to 
judicial selection influence judges’ decisions.”
62
  They 
point to research which shows that elected judges are 
more likely to be attentive to public opinion, overturn 
statutes, and uphold decisions in favor of the death 
penalty.
63
   
 
The line from judicial selection to policymaking is 
attenuated, but it arguably exists. Research suggests 
that judicial selection is one factor that influences 
judicial decision making; and state judges potentially 
exercise discretion in decisions that are relevant to the 
citizens of Missouri.  
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Richard P. Caldarone, Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark, 
“Partisan Labels and Democratic Accountability:  An Analysis 
of State Supreme Court Abortion Decisions,” The Journal of 
Politics 71, no. 2 (April 2009): 561, accessed June 6, 2014, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30218971.   
63
Ibid, 561. Caldarone, Canes-Wrone, and Clark specifically 
cite the following research:  Paul Brace and Brent D. Boyea, 
“Judicial Impartiality and the Practice of Electing Judges: The 
Case of State Supreme Court,” Presented at annual meeting of 
the American Political Science Association, 2004; Laura 
Langer, Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts: A 
Comparative Study (Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 2002); Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall, “The 
Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, and Rules in the 
Politics of Judicial Choice,” Journal of Politics 59, no. 4 
(1997): 1206-31.  
The degree of judicial discretion is debatable, but the 
opportunity to exercise discretion indicates that factors 
which influence judicial decision making, such as 
judicial selection, should be of concern to citizens. 
Judicial selection is relevant to citizens since it is one 
factor that may influence state judges who have the 
opportunity to make decisions that can impact state 
policy and citizens’ lives. Judicial selection is not 
simply a matter for esoteric legal debates; it is a 
practical matter for citizens. 
 
 
A Snapshot of Current Trends and Opinions  
in Missouri 
 
In 2013 newspapers began reporting on a new “wave” 
of initiatives nationwide to change judicial selection 
processes.
64
 Opponents of merit systems claim that 
dissatisfaction is growing, and they cite recent efforts 
in Tennessee, Kansas, Arizona, Oklahoma, and 
Missouri as evidence of this dissatisfaction.
65
   
 
In light of the resurgence of interest in reforming 
judicial selection processes in 2013, a survey of 
Missouri community college students was conducted 
in June 2014 to obtain a snapshot of current 
knowledge and opinions on judicial selection by young 
adults in the state. The methodology and findings from 
the student questionnaires are discussed below.  
 
This study also originally involved interviews with 
government officials, representatives of interest groups 
and citizen groups, and people who have publicly 
voiced either support or criticism of Missouri’s system 
of selecting judges in order to assess the core 
arguments for and against the Nonpartisan Court Plan. 
The methodology and the findings for the interviews 
with government officials and interest/citizen group 
representatives have not been reported due to the low 
response rate for the interviews.  
 
Most of the individuals contacted for interviews were 
either nonresponsive or indicated that they did not 
want to participate. Only one individual from a group 
in favor of the Nonpartisan Court Plan agreed to be 
interviewed, and this person was interviewed. 
                                                          
64
John Milburn, “Kansas rides a wave of judicial selection 
changes,” The Kansas City Star, May 11, 2013, accessed May 
22, 2014, www.kansascity.com.  
65
Tarr and Fitzpatrick, 1.  
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However, the findings from this interview have not 
been reported since both sides of the issue cannot be 
presented and a balanced assessment of the arguments 







The tool used for this study was a 19-question 
questionnaire. The questions were adapted from open-
ended questions in “Road Maps:  A ‘How-to’ Series to 
Help the Community, the Bench and the Bar 
Implement Change in the Justice System.” The 
questions were adapted and reprinted with permission 
from the American Bar Association.
66
 The response 
categories for each question were also derived 
partially, but not fully, from this source.  
 
The response categories for each question were limited 
in most cases, but the participants had an opportunity 
to select “other” for six of the questions and “do not 
know” for nine of the questions. The questionnaire 
took approximately fifteen minutes for participants to 
complete. It asked participants questions in five areas:  
qualities of judges, knowledge and preferences 
regarding judicial selection, opinion on judicial 
elections, opinions on merit selection, and safeguards 
against bad judges.  
 
                                                          
66
The survey questions on the questionnaire and discussed in 
the “Student Questionnaire” section of this article were adapted 
from “Road Maps:  A ‘How-to’ Series to Help the Community, 
the Bench and the Bar Implement Change in the Justice 
System.” ©2008 by the American Bar Association. Adapted 
and reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. This 
information or any or portion thereof may not be copied or 
disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in any 
electronic database or retrieval system without the express 
written consent of the American Bar Association. The response 
categories for each question were derived partially, but not 
fully, from this source: American Bar Association Coalition for 
Justice [Updated by the American Judicature Society and Malia 
Reddick], “Road Maps: A ‘How-to’ Series to Help the 
Community, the Bench and the Bar Implement Change in the 
Justice System.  Judicial Selection: The Process of Choosing 
Judges,” accessed March 28, 2014, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Justice
Center/Justice/PublicDocuments/judicial_selection_roadmap.a
uthcheckdam.pdf.    
Students at two-year institutions in the state of 
Missouri were targeted for the questionnaire to obtain 
a cross-section of the young adult population since 
community colleges attract both traditional and 
nontraditional students. The students were recruited to 
participate through their instructors who were 
contacted by the investigator. The investigator targeted 
nine classes throughout the state of Missouri, but only 
four instructors agreed to participate, and three classes 
ultimately participated since one course was cancelled.  
 
Consent forms, explaining the study and 
acknowledging risks, were completed by all 
participants. Questionnaires were completed by fifty-
two students in Missouri.
67
 All of the students who 
participated are residents of the state of Missouri. At 
the time of the survey, 73 percent (thirty-eight) of the 
students were between the ages of 18-24, 19 percent 
(ten) were between 25-34, and 8 percent (four) were 




The findings from the survey are broken down into the 
five substantive categories of the survey: Qualities of 
Judges, Judicial Selection Methods, Judicial Elections, 
and Merit Selection of Judges. 
 
Qualities of Judges. In order to provide context for the 
survey results, all of the participants were asked if they 
had ever had any direct interaction with judges. Forty-
two percent (twenty-two) of the students indicated that 
they have had direct interaction with a judge. Of the 
students who indicated that they have had direct 
interaction with a judge, an overwhelming 91 percent 
(twenty) indicated that their overall impression of the 
judge was positive. 
 
Respondents were also asked about the personal 
qualities and objective criteria judges should possess. 
First, they were asked to select the two most important 
personal qualities they would like to see in a judge, 
and were given the option of selecting independence, 
intelligence, fairness, impartiality, or another quality of 
their choice. The respondents indicated that the most 
important personal quality is fairness (forty-four 
students marked this as one of the top two), with 
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intelligence coming in second (thirty-three students 
marked this as one of the top two).  
 
With regard to the specific objective criteria judicial 
candidates should possess, respondents were given the 
option of selecting age, years of practicing law, type of 
law practiced, community involvement, or other. They 
were again asked to pick the top two qualities. The 
number of years of practicing law was the most 
important objective criterion to the students (forty-four 
students marked this as one of the top two); the type of 
law practiced was a distant second (twenty-nine 
students marked this as one of the top two). 
 
Judicial Selections Methods. Questions regarding 
both participant knowledge of judicial selection and 
participant preferences regarding selection methods 
were asked. Respondents were asked to identify how 
judges (Supreme Court, Appellate, Circuit, and 
Associate Circuit) are selected in the state, and were 
given the option of selecting elections; gubernatorial 
and/or legislative appointment; merit selection; or a 
combination of merit selection and other methods, 
depending on the level of court and/or location. 
Respondents were also given the option of selecting 
“do not know.” Forty-five percent (twenty-three) 
indicated that they do not know how judges are 
selected; 27 percent (fourteen) indicated that Missouri 
only uses elections; 24 percent (twelve) knew that 
Missouri uses a combination of merit selection and 
other methods, depending on the level of court and/or 
location; and 4 percent (two) indicated that Missouri 
only uses a system of gubernatorial and/or legislative 
appointments. 
 
Respondents were then asked what they believe is the 
best method of selecting judges. Fifty percent (twenty-
six) stated that a combination of methods is the best. 
Moreover, 53 percent (twenty-seven) responded that 
the method for selecting judges should be different at 
different levels of the court.
68
   
 
Judicial Elections. Since circuit and associate circuit 
judges are elected in most counties in Missouri, 
respondents were asked their opinion about elections. 
Ninety percent (forty-seven) indicated that the election 
of judges is good for the justice system, while only 10 
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Students were able to mark “Do Not Know” in response to 
these questions.  
percent (five) indicated that they are bad.  
 
In judicial elections, 10 percent (five)  indicated that 
they believe the public is given enough information 
about candidates to make informed election decisions, 
45 percent (twenty-three) said they are not, and 45 
percent (twenty-three) did not know. Additionally, 53 
percent (twenty-seven) responded that a candidate’s 
party affiliation (Democrat, Republican, etc.) should 
be known to voters.
69
 With regard to soliciting 
campaign funds, 55 percent (twenty-eight) stated that 
they should not be able to solicit campaign funds, 24 
percent (twelve) said that they should, and 21 percent 
(eleven) stated that they “do not know.” 
 
Merit Selection of Judges. As outlined previously, the 
state of Missouri also has more than 70 years of 
experience with merit selection of judges, thus the 
respondents were asked to weigh in on their opinion 
regarding some of the operational details of merit 
systems.  
 
The participants were advised that in most merit 
selection systems, a nominating commission screens 
judicial candidates, and they were asked to indicate 
who should sit on such a commission. They were 
given the options of gubernatorial and/or legislative 
appointees, lawyers, judges, citizens who are not 
lawyers, and other. Respondents were asked to mark 
all categories that apply. The support for the groups 
listed was relatively equal. Judges were selected by 
thirty-five students, citizens who are not lawyers by 
thirty-three students, gubernatorial and/or legislative 
appointees by twenty-six students, and lawyers by 
twenty-five students. Three indicated “other.” 
 
The respondents were also asked how members of the 
nominating commission should be selected. They were 
given the following categories: by elected officials, by 
lawyers, by judges, by voters, or other. Respondents 
were again asked to mark all that apply. The two 
categories selected most often were elected officials 
(thirty-one students marked) and voters (twenty-nine 
students marked). Judges were selected by twenty 
students and lawyers by fourteen students. Three 
students again indicated “other.” 
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Respondents were asked if there should be mandatory 
requirements for the composition of the nominating 
commission in merit selection systems.
 70
 Seventy-six 
percent (thirty-nine) answered affirmatively. Those 
who answered in the affirmative were also asked what 
requirements should be taken into consideration 
regarding the composition of the nominating 
commission. They were given the options of the 
balance of lawyers and non-lawyers, party affiliation, 
ethnic diversity, gender diversity, geographic diversity, 
and other. The balance of lawyers and non-lawyers 
was selected most often (twenty-seven students 
marked), gender diversity came in a close second 
(twenty-five students marked), party affiliation third 
(twenty-three students marked), ethnic diversity fourth 
(twenty-two students marked), and geographic 
diversity fifth (nineteen students marked). Two 
students marked “other.” 
 
Other. The final question asked respondents was if 
there are sufficient safeguards against bad judges in 
the state of Missouri. Seventy percent (thirty-four) 
stated that they do not know, 20 percent (ten) indicated 
that there are not, and 10 percent (five) responded that 
there are sufficient safeguards. 
 
Analysis 
For consistency and simplicity, the analysis section is 
also broken down into the five substantive categories 
of the survey: Qualities of Judges, Judicial Selection 
Methods, Judicial Elections, and Merit Selection of 
Judges. 
 
Qualities of Judges. The requirements to be a judge in 
the state of Missouri are somewhat minimal. Article V, 
Section 21 of the Missouri Constitution requires 
associate circuit judges to be at least 25 years old; and 
supreme court, court of appeals and circuit judges to 
be at least 30 years old. The judges must have also 
been citizens of the U.S. and qualified voters in the 
state for varying periods of time. Additionally, they 
must be licensed to practice law in Missouri. Based on 
the survey results, one of the few objective criteria 
listed in the Missouri Constitution, age, was of little 
importance to this group of respondents. However, a 
criterion which is related to age, the number of years 
of practicing law, was the most important objective 
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this question.  
criterion to the students. In other words, a specific age 
was not important, but experience practicing law was. 
 
Judicial Selections Methods. The survey results 
indicate that 45 percent of respondents did not know 
how judges are selected in the state. Based on the 
complicated system that Missouri has in place, this 
finding is not surprising. The more encouraging news 
for the level of civic knowledge in the state is that 24 
percent knew that Missouri uses a combination of 
merit selection and other methods, depending on the 
level of court and/or location.  
 
Additionally, although many of the respondents stated 
that they do not know the system used in Missouri, 
their opinions appear to support the present structure, 
which is a combination of merit selection and 
elections, depending on the level of court and/or 
location. When asked their opinion, half of the 
respondents stated that a combination of methods is 
the best, and more than half of the respondents stated 
that the method for selection judges should be different 
at different court levels. 
 
Judicial Elections. As stated previously, since circuit 
and associate circuit judges are elected in most 
counties in Missouri, respondents were asked their 
opinion regarding elections. The respondents 
overwhelmingly believe that the election of judges is 
good for the justice system.  
 
It should be noted, however, that the question asked 
about elections in general and did not specify 
competitive or retention elections. Although 90 percent 
believed that elections are good for the justice system, 
many (45 percent) do not believe that the public is 
given enough information to make informed election 
decisions. Their perception that the public lacks 
sufficient information may be related to more than half 
of the respondents indicating a candidate’s party 
affiliation (Democrat, Republican, etc.) should be 
known to voters. In other words, in the absence of 
sufficient information, voters may need party 
affiliation as a cue. The respondents’ perceptions that 
elections are good for the justice system also appears 
to have the caveat that elections are good for the 
system if candidates are not allowed to solicit 
campaign funds since 55 percent of the respondents 
stated that judges should not be able to ask for 
campaign monies.  
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Merit Selection of Judges. The questionnaire did not 
ask the participants questions about their knowledge of 
the details of the Nonpartisan Court Plan, but the 
respondents’ opinions again demonstrated support for 
the current structure. Under the Nonpartisan Court 
Plan, the merit system is made up of gubernatorial 
appointees who are not members of the bar, lawyers 
and a judge. The respondents indicated that all these 
groups should be represented on the nominating 
commission, with judges, appointees, and citizens 
receiving more support than lawyers.   
 
The respondents were also asked who should select the 
members of the nominating commission. This is one 
area in which the respondents’ opinions do not align 
with the current system. The plan calls for the 
governor to appoint three members, and the Missouri 
Bar to select three members. The respondents agreed 
that elected officials should play a part in selection; 
however, lawyers came in last among the possible 
choices of elected officials, judges, voters, and 
lawyers. 
 
Finally, a solid majority of respondents agree that there 
should be mandatory requirements for the composition 
of the nominating commission. The Missouri 
Nonpartisan Court Plan presently takes into 
consideration the balance of lawyers and non-lawyers 
as well as geographic diversity on the nominating 
commission.  
 
The respondents agreed that the balance of lawyers 
and non-lawyers should be taken into consideration, 
but indicated that gender diversity, party affiliation, 
and ethnic diversity are more important than 
geography when making decisions about the 
composition of the nominating body. 
 
 
Limitations and Recommendations  
for Future Research 
 
There were a number of limitations to this study which 
include a small sample size for both the student 
questionnaires and interviews. Generalizability to 
similar populations both within and outside of 
Missouri cannot be assumed for the student 
questionnaire because of the small number of 
respondents, and the interview findings cannot be 
reported due to the small sample. In order to increase 
participation, it is recommended that the student 
questionnaires be administered during the school year 
as opposed to the summer months since this may help 
increase participation by instructors and consequently 
students in the survey. Additionally, more individuals 
may agree to be interviewed regarding the Nonpartisan 
Court Plan during periods that the plan is a more 
salient issue for the legislature or voters. 
 
There are also limitations with the design of the 
student questionnaire. The questions used for the 
questionnaire were adapted from open-ended 
questions, and there is a need for further refinement of 
the response categories for the survey. For example, it 
is recommended for future research that the 
questionnaire instrument be refined to clarify if the 
questions regarding elections pertain to competitive 
elections or retention elections since this was not 
clearly stated.  
 
Analysis of the results was also complicated since 
respondents were allowed to select more than one 
response for some of the questions. The questionnaire 
may need to be modified to allow respondents to select 





The State of Missouri’s history of judicial selection 
and the ideological battles around the issue have 
reflected national trends since Missouri became a state 
in the early 1820s. The state’s experience with the plan 
has been uneventful at times, but has also been 
punctuated with periods of political turmoil. 
Challenges to the plan have continued to escalate over 
the past decade with renewed interest of reformers 
who seek to repeal and modify the plan.  
 
The survey results from a small sample of Missouri 
community college students show that almost a quarter 
of the students who participated are knowledgeable of 
the current system that is in place.  
 
Additionally, a majority of the students surveyed are 
supportive of a hybrid system of judicial selection 
which uses a combination of methods, and varies 
based on different court levels, which is similar to the 
system of judicial selection in the state. Although not 
generalizable, this pilot study provides insight into the 
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knowledge and opinions of one group of community 
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Table 1. Merit Systems: Arguments Regarding Advantages and Disadvantages 
 
Arguments Regarding Advantages Arguments Regarding Disadvantages 
 
Arguments regarding merit systems related to 
independence 
 Merit selection minimizes politics and promotes 
stability in the judicial selection process.
71
   
 Merit selection is in line with the founders’ 
desire to “project judicial independence from the 
whims and impulses of a majority.”
72
   
 Merit selection emphasizes “professional 
qualifications,” and “pre-appointment merit 
screening.”
73
 An emphasis on professional 
qualifications is in line with the characterization 
of judges as technicians. 





Argument regarding merit systems related to 
democratic legitimacy 
 In Missouri, the Nonpartisan Court Plan has 
pubic support with nearly three-quarters of 






Argument that merit systems do not actually provide 
independence 





Arguments that merit systems jeopardize 
accountability 
 The merit system gives lawyers and state bar 
associations a powerful role. Merit selection may 
not remove politics from judicial selection, but 
“may simply move the politics of judicial 
selection into closer alignment with the 
ideological preferences of the bar” which may 
differ from the ideological preferences of the 
public.
77
   
 Interest groups influence judicial selection 
regardless of the method used, and attempts to 
control the influence of special interests may 
actually advantage one group.
78
  
 The process can be secretive.79  
 Judges are rarely voted out by the public through 
retention elections, and are not accountable.
80
 A 
study of judicial retention trends from 1964-2006 
in ten states reported that “in only 56 of the 6,306 
judicial retention elections were judges not 
retained.”
81
 Retention elections do not provide 
the purported accountability since little 
information is provided to voters about the 
candidates; partisan affiliations, an important 
voter cue, are not listed on the ballot; and voters 
may be risk averse since they do not know who 
will replace the incumbent.
82
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Table 2. Judicial Elections: Arguments Regarding Advantages and Disadvantages 
 
Arguments Regarding Advantages Arguments Regarding Disadvantages 
 
Arguments regarding elections related to 
accountability 
 Elections are populist since elections put power 
“in the hands of the people.”
83
   
 
Arguments regarding elections related to democratic 
legitimacy 
 Elections are favored by the public, with 64 






Argument that elections do not actually provide 
accountability 
 Voters are uninformed about judicial candidates, 
and do not vote in judicial races. They also believe 
that judges who are elected are influenced by 
campaign contributions.
85
 The public may not have 
the “tools” needed to ensure that judges are 





Arguments that elections jeopardize independence 
 Partisan elections “infuse politics into the law.”87  
 Judicial campaigns have become “high-stakes 
contests, bringing in large sums of money and 
attack-driven advertising campaigns.”
88
 The large 
sums of money in judicial elections give the 




 Judicial elections receive considerable attention 
from special interest groups that are seeking 




 Campaigns may “blur the distinction between the 
job of a judge and the job of a legislator,” which 
may diminish public confidence in fairness and 
impartiality of the judiciary.
91
 The public may view 
judges as “politicians in robes.”
92
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